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Domestic Liquidity Conditions and Monetary Policy in Singapore   
Hwee Kwan Chow, Singapore Management University 
 
 
Abstract 
Singapore has an unusual exchange rate-centered monetary policy framework that 
has served the economy well over the past decades. Monetary policy operations are carried 
out by the central bank through the management of the Singapore dollar against a currency 
basket. As is well recognized, such foreign exchange interventions do have an impact on 
domestic liquidity conditions. However, in the case of Singapore, this tends to be 
counteracted by the liquidity impact of public sector operations related to the fiscal position 
and the national pension scheme. The central bank takes into account the net liquidity 
impact these and other autonomous money market factors as well as banks’ demand for 
funds when performing money market operations to regulate the amount of domestic liquidity 
in the financial system. We conclude with an explanation on the negligible liquidity impact of 
currency in circulation as reflecting Singapore’s gradual transformation towards a cashless 
society.  
 
Keywords and Phrases: currency management; domestic liquidity; cash in circulation; 
financial technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address: School of Economics, Singapore Management University, 
 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. 
Telephone: 65-6828 0868 
Fax:  65-6828 0833 
E-mail:  hkchow@smu.edu.sg. 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Singapore operated a currency board system when the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) was first established in 1971.  With the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s, instabilities in the world currencies led Singapore to develop 
its own exchange rate policy framework. Since 1973, the Singapore dollar has officially 
been on a managed float. An exchange rate centered monetary policy framework was 
formally adopted by 1981, reflecting the small and open nature of the economy. 
Singapore’s high degree of openness to trade is captured by its trade to GDP ratio, 
which is greater than three since the early 1970s. As a major financial center, Singapore 
has free capital mobility. Almost all forms of capital restrictions and foreign exchange 
controls have been eradicated since 1978. Even the restrictions on the non-
internationalization of the Singapore dollar, imposed to deter currency speculation, have 
been progressively removed over the years to facilitate the development of Singapore’s 
capital markets (Ong, 2003). 
 
Given Singapore’s open capital account, it follows from the open-economy 
trilemma,1 that the central bank needs to choose between interest rate targeting vis-à-vis 
exchange rate targeting. The MAS has chosen to use the exchange rate as opposed to 
the more conventional benchmark policy interest rate as its policy operating tool since 
the early 1980s (MAS, 2000). The rationale behind this decision is revealed when we 
consider the structure of the Singapore economy as well as its monetary transmission 
mechanism. Firstly, Singapore is highly dependent on external demand notwithstanding 
the economy’s gradual shift towards the services industry. Exportable services including 
financial, information technology and professional services along with externally-
orientated manufacturing account for more than half of aggregate output in Singapore. 
Secondly, domestic consumption has a high import content — out of every Singapore 
dollar spent in Singapore, approximately 60 cents go to imports. Being a price-taker in 
international markets, Singapore is highly susceptible to imported inflation. Hence, the 
highly open and trade-dependent nature of the economy implies that the exchange rate 
is the most effective tool for controlling inflation. 
 
                                                 
1 Obstfeld et al. (2004) summarizes the open economy trilemma by saying that monetary policy 
can only achieve fully two of the following three dimensions: monetary policy independence, fixed 
exchange rates, and open capital accounts. 
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By contrast, the Singapore economy is less interest rate sensitive, 
notwithstanding its status as a financial hub. MAS does not focus on the interest rate 
variable or a monetary aggregate in its conduct of monetary policy due to a lack of 
control over them — a reflection of Singapore’s openness to capital flows and a very 
liberal policy towards foreign direct investment. As a result of the exchange rate-
centered monetary policy framework and free capital mobility in Singapore, domestic 
short-term interest rates are significantly determined by foreign interest rates. Findings 
from a monetary VAR analysis in Chow (2005) suggest the exchange rate is indeed 
more influential than the interest rate as a source of macroeconomic fluctuations. With 
the support of flexible factor markets and strong institutions, the past track record of low 
inflation 2  and prolonged economic growth attests to the effectiveness of using the 
exchange rate as a key monetary policy instrument. 
 
In the next section, we discuss the operation of Singapore’s monetary policy 
framework. The implications of this framework on domestic liquidity conditions and how 
this is counteracted by the liquidity impact of public sector operations related to the fiscal 
position and the national pension scheme is examined in Section 3. We conclude in 
Section 4 with the evolution of one of the money market factors currency in circulation, 
that reflects Singapore’s gradual transformation to a cashless society. 
 
2.  Singapore’s Monetary Policy Framework 
Monetary policy operations are carried out by the MAS through managing the 
Singapore dollar under a basket-band-crawl (BBC) system (Khor et al., 2004). Under this 
system, the MAS monitors the value of the domestic currency in terms of a currency 
basket (S$NEER) which is a trade-weighted average of the currencies of Singapore’s 
major trading partners and competitors. These represent the various sources of imported 
inflation and competition in the export markets, with the periodically updated basket 
weights reflecting their degree of importance. Neither the constituent currencies nor their 
assigned weights in the basket are publicly disclosed. In view of Singapore’s diversified 
                                                 
2 Chow et al. (2014) showed through a DSGE-VAR model that export price shocks were a major 
source of output volatility in Singapore and consequently, the exchange rate system at work had 
a comparative advantage over Taylor rule in terms of reducing inflation volatility. Indeed, CPI 
inflation in Singapore averaged around 2.3% since 1980 which is relatively lower than in the 
advanced countries. 
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trade pattern, targeting a currency basket instead of a single foreign currency results in a 
more stable effective exchange rate. 
   
The MAS uses a prescribed policy band centered at a parity that is the target 
exchange rate for the S$NEER. The target rate reflects the long-run equilibrium 
exchange rate and is allowed to adjust gradually over time, keeping the policy band in 
tandem with Singapore’s slowly changing long-term economic fundamentals. The crawl 
circumvents the emergence of a situation where the currency becomes significantly 
misaligned. It thereby reduces the incentive for speculative attacks against the currency. 
The S$NEER is allowed to float within the prescribed policy band to allow for short-term 
fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets. The undisclosed policy band is sufficiently 
wide so that market participants cannot be sure of making a profit even when they 
correctly speculate on an impeding change. Nevertheless, too wide a band is avoided to 
prevent the Singapore dollar from overshooting. The Singapore dollar is frequently used 
as a proxy for broader Asian currency risk which means that changes in the 
fundamentals of other regional currencies could lead to overshooting of the Singapore 
dollar. 
 
The MAS can directly influence the value of the currency and defend the band by 
carrying out intervention operations in the foreign exchange markets. Sometimes, 
interventions are carried out within the band to smooth out short-term exchange rate 
volatility since the latter could impair confidence in the currency. Additionally, when the 
S$NEER approaches or exceeds the boundaries of the policy band, the MAS may 
intervene to “lean against the wind,” which means resisting the recent trend of the 
exchange rate thereby preventing the bounds from being breached. Such intervention 
operations resist misalignments and push the S$NEER towards its estimated equilibrium 
value.3 The MAS monitors the S$NEER closely and manages the currency on a daily 
                                                 
3 MacDonald (2004) estimated the equilibrium level of Singapore’s real effective exchange rate 
and found the Singapore dollar to be close to equilibrium in the early 2000s. Nonetheless, as 
illustrated in Phillips et al. (2013), estimating the equilibrium exchange rate has become more 
complex. Apart from traditional fundamental variables, financial factors and policy variables have 
to be taken into consideration in determining the real exchange rate. The extent to which the 
central bank will intervene in the foreign exchange market in order to lean against misalignments 
will thus depend on how certain they are regarding their assessment of currency misalignment.    
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basis, even though it “refrains from intervening unnecessarily and allows market forces 
to determine the level of the Singapore dollar within the policy band” (MAS, 2013).4  
 
In comparison, monetary policy formulation takes place twice a year. In its 
semiannual monetary policy formulation cycle, the MAS would announce the exchange 
rate policy stance through a Monetary Policy Statement. Appropriate changes are made 
to the level, slope and width of the policy band if these are deemed necessary through 
an assessment of prevailing as well as outlook of economic and market conditions. For 
instance, the MAS widened its policy bands with heightened volatility in the foreign 
exchange markets during the Asian crisis and subsequently narrowed them when a 
degree of calm had returned to the regional markets. In response to the global financial 
crisis (the direct effect of which was less severe), MAS flattened its policy band and re-
centered it at a lower level. Apart from being a counter-cyclical tool in the short term, the 
primary objective of monetary policy is to provide an environment of price stability over 
the medium term conducive for sustainable economic growth. To this end, the MAS 
guides the path of the exchange rate to ensure it remains consistent with Singapore 
economic fundamentals. 
 
3. Currency Management and Domestic Liquidity Impact 
Countries with an export-led growth strategy would typically maintain a low 
international value of their domestic currency to prevent a loss of competitiveness (Calvo 
et al. 1995). However, despite its openness and reliance on export growth, Singapore 
maintains a strong Singapore dollar policy. Figure 1 below depicts a time plot of 
Singapore’s nominal and real effective exchange rate as compiled by the IMF, denoted 
by NEER and REER respectively.5 The exchange rate variables NEER and REER have 
been defined such that a rise in their value signals an appreciation of the Singapore 
dollar.  
 
                                                 
4 Over the years, Singapore has maintained a conservative fiscal policy as well as a commitment 
to low inflation and a strong Singapore dollar which helped to build the central bank’s credibility. 
Hence, market participants appears mostly convinced of MAS’ commitment to enforce the policy 
band and they tend to keep within it. Such market discipline in turn alleviates the need for 
frequent central bank intervention operations in the foreign exchange markets (Krugman, 1991). 
 
5 Due to the unavailability of more current data on MAS’ trade weighted index (S$NEER), we use 
the nominal exchange rate as computed by the IMF which is denoted by NEER. Both the NEER 
and REER time series are indexes whose values in 2010 are normalized to 100.  
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Figure 1: Singapore’s Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates 
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
NEER REER  
      Source: International Financial Statistics 
 
It is clear from the secular upward trend of NEER in Figure 1 that the Singapore 
dollar in nominal terms has been appreciating against its major trading partners over the 
past decades. We also note that REER remained strong since the implementation of the 
exchange rate regime. The narrowing of the gap between NEER and REER after 1980 
can be attributed to the relatively low inflationary environment in Singapore during this 
period. For instance, Singapore’s consumer price index inflation averaged over the two 
periods of 1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 1999 are 2.8% and 1.9% respectively. These are 
lower than the corresponding numbers of 6.5% and 2.9% for the advanced countries, 
see Wilson (2015). Key considerations behind the strong Singapore dollar policy are the 
desire to maintain confidence in the domestic currency and to ensure price stability. After 
all, liberalized capital flows and a stable currency are important requirements for 
Singapore’s role as an international financial sector and the development of a large 
offshore banking sector. 
 
Although the exchange rate has not been used to safeguard competitiveness, 
Singapore’s competitiveness does not seem to have been compromised by the strong 
Singapore dollar policy (Wilson, 2015). In fact, Singapore has been recording recurrent 
current account surpluses over successive decades.6  A plausible explanation is the 
appreciation of the Singapore dollar has been accompanied by a lower inflation, leaving 
                                                 
6  The overall balance of payment remained positive but for rare occasions, in spite of the 
persistent export of capital abroad. 
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Singapore’s relative price competitiveness unaffected by the appreciation. Meanwhile, 
the secular appreciation of the domestic currency has the advantageous effect of 
pushing the Singapore companies to move up the value chain to focus on higher value-
added industries, thereby producing more technology-, skill- and capital-intensive 
exports. This, as well as its more moderate inflation, enables Singapore to maintain its 
international competitiveness despite the secular rise of its nominal exchange rate. 
 
The upward trend in the domestic currency reflects the strong and improving 
fundamentals of the Singapore economy over the past decades. In particular, strong 
foreign capital inflows, consistent budget surpluses and high levels of domestic savings 
exert an upward pressure on the Singapore dollar to appreciate. Correspondingly, the 
foreign exchange intervention operations carried out by the MAS have mostly been to 
mitigate the appreciation of the domestic currency. Despite adopting a basket numeriare, 
it is not necessary to carry out intervention operations using all the component 
currencies of the basket. Not surprisingly, the MAS intervenes in the US dollar (USD) 
exchange market as it is the most liquid (MAS, 2013). When MAS sells the Singapore 
dollar against the US dollar, there is an injection of Singapore dollars into the banking 
system which raises the level of domestic liquidity. There is a corresponding a rise in 
foreign reserves and an increase in the monetary base.7  
  
One macro-economic implication of defending appreciations is thus the increase 
in inflationary pressure, unless the MAS carries out sterilization of its foreign exchange 
intervention. Nevertheless, there are domestic costs and risks associated with such 
sterilized intervention especially when sterilization is substantial and prolonged (Lavigne, 
2008). In the case of Singapore, the increase in the level of domestic liquidity due to foreign 
exchange intervention by the MAS tends to be offset by the withdrawal of liquidity due to the 
very high level of savings in the economy. Hence, the MAS does not necessarily have to 
sterilize its intervention operations if the banking system already has an appropriate level of 
liquidity. 
 
                                                 
7  Foreign exchange reserves rose from US$6.6 billion in 1980 to US$248 billion in 2014 in 
Singapore. The high level foreign reserves, in turn, serves to deter currency speculators as it 
grants MAS to the latitude to carry out intervention operations on a sufficiently large scale to 
defend the currency. 
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Singapore’s high level of savings is mainly due to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
which is a government administered compulsory savings scheme, and the government’s 
strong fiscal position. As a result of prudent fiscal management, the government of 
Singapore generally ran persistent budget surpluses, averaging around 5% of GDP since 
the early 1990s. Consequently, the Account-General Department acting as the 
Government's accountant would normally transfer funds from its accounts with 
commercial banks to its deposit account with MAS. The MAS, as the government’s 
financial agent, is in receipt of deposits from the government. Such transfers are 
recorded as large sums in the item "Government Deposits" on the liabilities side of MAS 
balance sheet and they represent a liquidity drain from the domestic banking system. 
 
As for the CPF, this is a mandatory defined contribution pension fund scheme where 
both employees and employers are required to contribute a certain percentage of the 
employees' income to the CPF.8 Funds are disbursed to members by the CPF Board under 
various withdrawal schemes. As contributions tends to be in excess of withdrawals, the 
CPF Board usually transfer funds to MAS by way of an advanced deposit with MAS 
pending its purchase of special non-marketable Singapore Government Securities. 
These are issued specially to the CPF Board to meet its investment requirements and 
mop up the surplus funds of CPF. The net positive contributions to CPF tend to be 
sizable and represent a withdrawal of funds from the banking system. Along with the 
fiscal surpluses, the CPF transactions contributed to a high gross national savings rate 
of above 40% in much of the past decades (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
8 Employee and employer’s CPF contribution rates are currently at 17% and 20% of gross salary 
for those earning above S$750 per month and below 56 years old. 
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Figure 2. Gross National Savings Rate (in millions of S$ and as % of GDP) 
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In summary, both the CPF Board and Account-General Department tend to 
transfer funds to the MAS which represent a drain on domestic liquidity. In order to 
overcome this liquidity drain, the MAS can conduct money market operations to ensure 
there is sufficient liquidity in the banking system. Other autonomous money market factors 
are currency in circulation as well as the issuance, redemption and coupon payments of 
Singapore Government Securities (SGS) and Treasury Bills. The central bank takes into 
account the net liquidity impact all these factors and banks’ demand for funds to assess the 
level of liquidity required in the banking system. Instruments used for money market 
operations include foreign exchange (reverse) swaps, direct lending to or borrowing from 
banks, repurchase agreement on SGS and MAS bills (MAS, 2013). With the use of 
market operations, the MAS has been able to regulate the amount of liquidity in the 
banking system. 
 
While details of money market operations are made available in the 
Macroeconomic Review, time series data on public sector operations; MAS intervention 
operations; and MAS money market operations; are in general not publicly available. 
However, a monograph on money operations was published by the MAS in 2013 that 
released a table of values on the various components of money market liquidity from 
2007 to 2012. Part of that table is reproduced as Table 1, recording the liquidity impact 
of various money market factors as well as that of monetary policy and money market 
operations. 
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Table 1. Liquidity Impact of Money Market Factors and MAS’ Operations 
 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore 
 
Over this period, we see from the table that public sector operations had a net 
negative impact on liquidity in the banking system and the magnitude of the impact is 
larger than the other two money market factors, namely currency in circulation as well as 
SGS issuance, redemption and coupon payment. In particular, we note from Table 1 that 
currency in circulation has a negligible impact on domestic liquidity. As recorded in the past 
issues of MAS’ Macroeconomic Review, public sector operations has consistently been 
the dominant negative money market factor over the successive years since 2003. 
 
The item on foreign exchange operations in Table 1 combines direct foreign 
exchange interventions with money market operations using foreign exchange swaps. 
Although we are not able to distinguish monetary policy operations from money market 
operations, we observe an injection of liquidity into banking system through the 
combined foreign exchange operations in the various financial years. In terms of the 
distribution of instruments used in money market operations, MAS bills have gained 
importance since its introduction in 2011. As a share of money market instrument used, 
it rose from 25% in FY11/12 to 68% in FY14/15. There is a corresponding decline in the 
use of foreign exchange swaps from 73% to 43%. 
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Looking ahead, there are concerns that CPF net contributions could turn into net 
withdrawals as the population ages. After all, the CPF plays a key role as the fund for 
retirement income. In this event, the CPF transfers would be injecting instead of 
removing liquidity from the domestic banking system that could potentially increase 
inflationary pressures (Yip, 2005). Meanwhile, the Singapore economy is projected to 
experience a slower growth path associated with the decrease in labour supply.9 This 
suggests a likely fall in the tax revenue while government expenditure, especially on 
healthcare, rises. Such a scenario points to a decline in the government budget surplus 
that also reduces the drain from domestic liquidity.  
 
However, the attendant fall in savings rate and the narrowing of current account 
surpluses implies that the Singapore dollar may no longer appreciate strongly on a trend 
basis as in the past (Khor and Robinson, 2005). This alleviates the need for intervention 
to moderate the strength of the Singapore dollar. In any case, when there is reduced 
offsetting liquidity impact from public sector operations, the central bank could still rely on 
MAS bills to drain excess liquidity in the banking system.  This way, the MAS could use 
money market operations to regulate the level of liquidity in the domestic economy to 
foster stable money market conditions and to keep the financial system functioning 
smoothly. 
 
 
4. Cash in circulation 
As observed in the previous section, currency in circulation does not carry much 
weight as a money market factor in Singapore. Figure 3 displays the ratio of currency in 
circulation to M1 money supply in 1991-2016. It is evident from the figure that the ratio 
has been on a steady decline, falling from nearly 50% in 1991 to around 20% in 2011. 
The level seems to have stabilized at around 20% after 2011. The decline of currency in 
circulation can in large part be explained by policies undertaken in Singapore to move 
towards a cashless society.  
 
                                                 
9 While the ageing workforce has been partially mitigated by immigration policies, the current 
political climate poses constrains on the intake of large numbers of foreign workers.  
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Figure 3. Ratio of Currency in Circulation to M1 Money Supply (%) 
 
Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore 
 
 
In 1985, Singapore launched a National Campaign to Minimise Cash 
Transactions to encourage Singaporeans to carry out their transactions electronically. 
The primary objective for reducing cash transactions was to save manpower cost, 
thereby increase productivity. The three specific goals of the campaign were to (i) urge 
receipt of wages through direct credit to the bank; (ii) encourage payment of bills 
electronically via General Interbank Recurring Order; and (iii) promote payments through 
the Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale system. Additionally, steps were also 
taken to develop related infrastructure such as allowing commercial banks to place more 
Automated Teller Machines island-wide and building electronic networks. In particular, 
the setting up of the Network for Electronic Transfers in January 1986 was viewed as a 
milestone in Singapore's drive to become a cashless society. Efforts at transforming 
Singapore into a cashless society were gradual and effective. 
 
Cashless transactions in Singapore started to become more commonplace from 
mid-1990s with the expansion in the menu of electronic payment options. According to 
data from the Bank of International Settlements, transaction volumes in card-based 
electronic money shot up from .03 million to 2 billion between 1996 and 2010. The 
corresponding increase in usage for debit cards, direct debits and credit transfers in the 
same period were 56 million to 203 million, 20 million to 57 million, and 14 million to 35 
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million respectively. In terms of transaction value, there was a greater than four-fold 
increase for debit cards and direct debits to SGD 25 billion and SGD 31 billion in 2010 
respectively. Meanwhile, the transaction value for credit transfers went up by 2.3 times 
to SGD 179 billion. Despite the surge in transaction volumes of card-based electronic 
money, total value of transactions only went up SGD 2 billion, suggesting that this form 
of cashless payment instrument was used mostly for payments in small transactions.  
 
More recently, the advent of the digital revolution is transforming payment 
systems. For instance, physical wallets and credit cards are being replaced by payment 
solutions provided by non-financial players such as Apple, Google, Paypal, Amazon and 
the likes. Online payment is now a cheap and safe way of transferring funds, and can be 
effected through mobile devices like smart phones and tablets that have become 
ubiquitous. Singapore has various characteristics identified by Haddad and Hornuf (2016) 
that predisposes it to more financial technology (fintech) innovations. These include well-
developed capital markets that provide fintech startups with better access to capital to 
fund their business; availability of latest technology that enable new practices and 
business models to emerge; high mobile phone subscriptions that facilitate retail point of 
sale and mobile wallet transactions; as well as immigration policies that attract foreign 
talent to join its financial sector workforce.  
 
In view of the dynamism that fintech could inject to Singapore’s financial industry, 
the MAS10 committed SGD 225 million to support over a five-year span the creation of a 
vibrant fintech ecosystem, whereby the adoption of new payments technologies is a key 
emphasis. For instance, the MAS is currently working towards greater inter-operability 
across payment systems for more seamless payments across different platforms. The 
fintech initiative is part of the Smart Nation program launched in Singapore in November 
2014 that has the vision of enabling better living through the extensive and systematic 
use of info-comm technology. The advent of fintech startups which provide many 
financial services do disrupt some traditional financial institutions. In response, financial 
Institutions in Singapore are setting up in-house fintech units such as “innovation labs” in 
the banks and insurance companies. 
                                                 
10 Apart from its role as a central bank, the MAS is also responsible for the supervision and 
development of the Singapore financial services sector. 
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As is generally recognized, financial innovation alters the risk profile of financial 
institutions and makes risks assessment more difficult. MAS as the regulator of the 
financial sector has to thread carefully when managing risks without stifling innovation. 
To avoid over-regulation, the MAS eschews a one-size-fits-all approach and adopts a 
risk-based approach. Since a payment service through the internet are typically small 
payments related to e-commerce, they may not attract regulation. However, more 
significant players will be regulated under the Payment Systems Oversight Act or 
Remittance Agents Act. These are modular regulation customized to address the 
specific risks or concerns they pose.11 In the words of MAS’ managing director, Mr Ravi 
Menon, "The aim is to make payments swift, simple and secure. The vision is less cash, 
less cheques, fewer cards.”12 Going forward, cash will become a less common means of 
payment in Singapore as it continues its efforts to transform into a cashless society. 
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